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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4526 
 ___________ 
 
 ANDREW WALZER, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MURIEL SIEBERT & CO.; NATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC;  
GERARD KOSKE; RONALD BONO; MURIEL SIEBERT 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-05672) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2011 
 
 Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit  Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: October 6, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Andrew Walzer appeals pro se from the District Court‟s orders dismissing his 
complaint and declining to reconsider that ruling.  We will affirm.  
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I. 
 The parties are familiar with the background of this case, which we partially 
summarized in Walzer v. Muriel Siebert & Co., 221 F. App‟x 153 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Briefly, Walzer opened a personal brokerage account with Muriel Siebert & Co. (“MSC”) 
in 1980.  He later entered into an options agreement with MSC permitting him to buy 
securities on margin.  In 2002, MSC decided to require Walzer to increase the percentage 
of equity in his account (generally referred to as a margin or maintenance requirement).  
Walzer objected that the existing equity was sufficient under New York Stock Exchange 
and Federal Reserve requirements.  MSC responded by claiming the right to require 
additional equity under a 1996 options agreement between the parties.
1
   
 Walzer did not deposit funds to cover the increased margin requirement.  He faced 
numerous margin calls as a result, and MSC sold approximately $802,000 worth of his 
securities from July 2002 through October 2002 when Walzer failed to meet them.  
Walzer alleges that the sales occurred during unfavorable market conditions and resulted 
in a substantial loss.  After MSC completed the sales, it provided Walzer with a copy of 
the 1996 agreement under which it claimed the right to increase his margin requirement.  
Walzer claims that the document is forged.  
                                                 
1
 Though we need not and do not resolve that factual issue, we have observed that 
“[m]ost brokers by contract fix higher maintenance requirements for their own 
protection.”  Walck v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 780 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982).  Such 
contracts generally permit brokers to issue margin calls when the funds in a customer‟s 
account fall below the margin requirement and then sell the customer‟s securities if the 
customer fails to deposit sufficient funds.  See id. 
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 In 2003, Walzer filed suit against MSC in New York state court, asserting claims 
for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud.  MSC moved to compel 
arbitration under an arbitration clause contained in the 1996 agreement.  In January 2005, 
the New York state court granted the motion on the basis of an undisputedly authentic 
1992 agreement that also contained an arbitration clause and then stayed the action 
pending arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). 
 Shortly before that ruling, Walzer filed pro se the federal suit at issue here.  He 
asserted his state-law claims as well as the federal securities fraud claims discussed 
below.  As defendants, Walzer named MSC; its CEO Muriel Siebert; its clearance broker 
National Financial Services, LLC (“NFS”); Ronald Bono, an MSC vice president who 
provided Walzer with a copy of the 1996 agreement; and Gerald Koske, an MSC 
compliance officer who allegedly concealed the purported forgery. 
 Defendants filed motions to stay or dismiss the federal action, arguing in relevant 
part that the complaint was barred by res judicata because the New York state court 
already had decided that Walzer‟s claims are subject to arbitration.  The District Court 
granted the motions under Rule 12(b)(6), and Walzer appealed.  We affirmed as to 
Walzer‟s state-law claims but remanded for further proceedings on his federal claims.  
See Walzer, 221 F. App‟x at 156-57.  As we explained, the New York state court 
determined only that the 1992 arbitration clause was valid and compelled arbitration of 
Walzer‟s state-law claims.  See id.  Thus, we remanded for further proceedings on 
Walzer‟s federal claims, though we did not require any proceedings in particular.  See id. 
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at 157. 
 On remand, defendants moved to stay the federal action pending the FINRA 
arbitration.  Walzer sought discovery on the 1992 arbitration clause in order to respond.  
A Magistrate Judge denied his request by order entered July 25, 2008 (Docket No. 162), 
and then granted defendants‟ motions and stayed the action pending arbitration by order 
entered December 31, 2008 (Docket No. 179).  Walzer filed a motion for reconsideration 
of that order, but the Magistrate Judge dismissed it without prejudice on March 17, 2009 
(Docket No. 182), because Walzer failed to comply with the District Court‟s previous 
order of January 17, 2006, which required him to seek leave before filing such motions.  
Walzer did not seek further review by the District Court. 
 The FINRA arbitration was resolved in MSC‟s favor on December 29, 2009.  
Defendants sought permission to lift the stay of the federal action and file appropriate 
motions, which the Magistrate Judge granted them leave to do by order entered April 9, 
2010 (Docket No. 203).  Defendants then filed motions to confirm the arbitration award 
and dismiss Walzer‟s federal claims on numerous grounds, including failure to state a 
claim.  By opinion and order entered August 10, 2010 (Docket Nos. 228 & 229), the 
District Court denied defendants‟ motions to confirm the arbitration award but granted 
their motions to dismiss Walzer‟s federal counts for failure to state a claim.  Walzer filed 
a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied by opinion and order 
entered October 28, 2010 (Docket Nos. 236 & 237).  Walzer filed a notice of appeal, 
along with another motion for reconsideration.  The District Court denied that motion by 
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order entered December 17, 2010 (Docket No. 244), and Walzer amended his notice of 
appeal to include that ruling.  A New York state court has since confirmed the FINRA 
arbitration award, but Walzer asserts that he has appealed that decision and it has no 
bearing on our disposition of the issues on appeal.   
II. 
 Walzer challenges seven orders on appeal:  (1) the Magistrate Judge‟s July 25, 
2008 order denying his request for discovery on the 1992 arbitration clause (Docket No. 
162); (2) the Magistrate Judge‟s December 31, 2008 order staying the federal action 
pending the FINRA arbitration (Docket No. 179); (3) the Magistrate Judge‟s March 17, 
2009 order dismissing his motion for reconsideration of the previous order (Docket No. 
182); (4) the Magistrate Judge‟s April 9, 2010 order permitting defendants to file their 
motions to dismiss (Docket No. 203); (5) the District Court‟s August 10, 2010 order 
dismissing Walzer‟s complaint (Docket No. 229); (6) the District Court‟s October 28, 
2010 order denying Walzer‟s motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 237); and (7) the 
District Court‟s December 17, 2010 order denying his second motion for reconsideration 
(Docket No. 244).  Because most of the issues he raises relate to numerous orders, we 
will address the underlying issues rather than the particular orders seriatim.
2
 
                                                 
2
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court‟s dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.  See Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 
(3d Cir. 2011).  “To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  A claim is 
plausible if such factual matter permits “„the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
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A. The Merits of Walzer‟s Claims and Leave to Amend 
 Walzer devotes most of his brief to arguments unrelated to the merits of his 
claims, but we begin by addressing that issue.  Walzer‟s primary claim is that defendants 
violated Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 
78j(b), and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5.  In general terms, the statute and rule prohibit material misrepresentations or 
omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.  See Matrixx Initiatives, 
131 S. Ct. at 1317; McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 424 (3d Cir. 2007).  A 
private cause of action under Section 10(b) has six elements, including reliance on the 
misrepresentation or omission.  See Matrixx Initiatives, 131 S. Ct. at 1317; McCabe, 494 
F.3d at 424.  That element required Walzer to “plead that he . . . reasonably and 
justifiably relied on an alleged misrepresentation.  This burden requires a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that defendants‟ conduct caused him to engage in the transaction in 
                                                                                                                                                             
liable for the misconduct alleged[.]‟”  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 
1309, 1323 (2011) (citation omitted).  Walzer‟s securities fraud claims also are subject to 
the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, see 
id. at 1318 n.4, 1324, though our disposition does not require us to apply them.  We 
review for abuse of discretion matters of discovery and docket control, see In re Fine 
Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982), and the District Court‟s decision 
to dismiss a complaint without leave to amend, which is proper when amendment would 
be inequitable or futile, see In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1434 (3d Cir. 1997).  We review the denial of reconsideration for abuse of discretion as 
well, though we review underlying issues of law de novo.  See Max‟s Seafood Café ex 
rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).  Walzer‟s appeal from 
the denial of reconsideration brings up for review the underlying dismissal of his 
complaint.  See Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat‟l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1352 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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question.”  Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). 
 Walzer alleges that MSC sold securities in his account after improperly raising his 
margin requirement pursuant to the 1996 agreement, which he contends is forged.  In its 
opinion of August 10, 2010, the District Court treated MSC‟s presentation of the 1996 
agreement as the alleged misrepresentation.  It held that Walzer had not pleaded reliance 
on that representation because he alleged that MSC did not provide him with a copy of 
the 1996 agreement until after the sales at issue were complete.  (Docket No. 228 at 16.)  
It further concluded that Walzer expressly alleged that he did not rely on the 
representation because he contested MSC‟s authority to make the sales.  (Id.)  Finally, it 
concluded that Walzer did not plead reliance because he alleged that it was MSC that 
sold the securities at issue and that it did so without his consent.  (Id.)  In sum, the 
District Court concluded that Walzer had pleaded nothing more than a claim for breach of 
contract, which we already had decided was subject to arbitration pursuant to the New 
York state judgment.  (Id.)
3
 
 Walzer argues that the District Court misread his complaint and drew inferences 
against him.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 19-24.)  He asserts that the actionable misrepresentation 
                                                 
3
 Neither the District Court nor the parties cited any authority addressing a similar claim.  
We have located one decision.  The plaintiff in that case, like Walzer, sued his brokerage 
firm for raising his margin requirement and then selling his securities to meet a margin 
call.  See Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504, 506-08 (2d Cir. 1994).  The plaintiff 
asserted a claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, but the case ultimately was 
submitted to a jury only on state-law claims, including breach of contract.  See id. at 508.  
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was not the allegedly forged 1996 agreement, which he concedes MSC provided him 
after its sales were complete, but MSC‟s representations while it was making those sales 
that the agreement permitted it to do so.  He also asserts that his complaint should not be 
read to allege that he affirmatively objected to MSC‟s actions. 
 The second of these assertions is belied by the complaint itself.  See Compl. 
(Docket No. 1) at 6 ¶ 16(f) (“I/plaintiff also several times called . . . NFS, to complain of 
improper margin calls”).  Even if both were the case, however, the point remains that 
Walzer alleges nothing suggesting that he personally sold securities in reliance on any 
representation by MSC.  To the contrary, Walzer repeatedly alleges that it was MSC, and 
not he, who decided to sell securities from his account to cover the allegedly improper 
margin calls.  See, e.g., id. at 4 ¶ 15 (referring to defendants‟ “forced sales” and “forced 
margin selling”), 5 ¶ 16(b) (“The Defendant forced sales of various Plaintiff‟s securities  
. . . by issuing these improper margin calls, then doing certain margin sell-outs”), 6 ¶ 
16(d) (defendants “took control of Plaintiff‟s Account and forced sales”), 7 ¶ 16(g) 
(“Defendant . . . continued to force more sales of plaintiff‟s securities without consent”).  
Thus, we agree with the District Court that Walzer did not plead reliance.  Cf. Angelastro 
v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944-45 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that plaintiff 
stated a Section 10(b) claim by alleging that her broker‟s misstatements concerning her 
margin account interest rate induced her to buy securities on margin). 
 Walzer also argues that the District Court should have permitted him to amend his 
                                                                                                                                                             
The court did not specify why the plaintiff‟s federal claim was not submitted to the jury. 
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complaint.  He filed a motion for leave to amend after defendants filed their motions to 
dismiss, but he did not seek leave to include anything relevant to reliance and instead 
sought only to drop NFS as a defendant for lack of scienter and to assert a claim for “mail 
fraud.”  (Docket No. 216 at 1-2.)  He first advanced an alternate theory of reliance in the 
District Court in his motion for reconsideration, but the District Court rejected it and 
Walzer has not pressed it on appeal.
4
   
 Instead, he now advances a third theory.  According to Walzer, he can amend his 
complaint to plead reliance because (contrary to the allegations in his existing complaint) 
MSC allowed him to choose which securities it would sell in twenty-two of the twenty-
four transactions at issue.  (Appellant‟s Br. at 26-28.)  Walzer did not present this theory 
to the District Court.  Even if it were properly before us, it still does not allege reliance 
because Walzer does not assert that MSC‟s alleged representations led him to choose 
certain securities rather than others.  Newton, 259 F.3d at 174.  We are thus satisfied that 
any amendment of this claim would be futile.
5
 
 Walzer asserted three other federal claims in the District Court but raises only two 
                                                 
4
 Walzer argued that he “collaterally relied” on the allegedly forged agreement because 
MSC used it to induce NFS to execute the sale of his securities.  The District Court 
rejected this argument because it still did not assert that Walzer himself relied on MSC‟s 
alleged representations.  (Docket No. 236 at 16-18 & n.3.) 
 
5
 The District Court also determined that leave to amend this claim would be inequitable:  
“While [pro se] status entitles Mr. Walzer to some amount of indulgence, it does not 
grant him unlimited license to change the theories on which his claims rest in order to 
circumvent earlier judgments of the Court—especially after six years of protracted 
litigation.”  (Docket No. 236 at 17.)  We agree with this conclusion as well. 
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of them on appeal.  First, Walzer claims that MSC violated Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-16 by failing to provide him with a disclosure statement 
when he first entered into an options agreement in 1982.  The District Court held that this 
claim is barred by the Exchange Act statute of limitations, which is the earlier of five 
years after the alleged violation or two years after its discovery.  (Docket No. 228 at 14 
n.5) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)). Walzer concedes that the claim as asserted in his 
complaint is untimely, but argues that he can amend it to allege a lack of disclosures in 
connection with his “1990s” agreements (apparently in 1992 and 1996).  (Appellant‟s Br. 
at 54-55.)  Walzer did not present this theory to the District Court and, as defendants 
argue, this claim remains untimely in any event. 
 Second, Walzer claims that MSC violated Section 8 of the Exchange Act and SEC 
Rule 8c-1 by hypothecating his securities without his consent.  As the District Court 
explained, however, Walzer alleges that MSC sold his securities, not that it hypothecated 
them.  See Black‟s Law Dictionary 811 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “hypothecate” as “[t]o 
pledge (property) as security or collateral for a debt, without delivery of title or 
possession”).  Walzer argues that MSC effectively treated his securities as collateral for 
his own margin loans and once again seeks leave to replead (Appellant‟s Br. at 42-44), 
but the fact remains that MSC‟s sale of those securities is not a hypothecation.6 
                                                 
6
 The claim that Walzer has not pressed on appeal is that defendants violated Section 
17(a) of the Exchange Act and associated rules by failing to provide a copy of his options 
agreement on request.  The District Court dismissed this claim because the statute and 
rules do not provide for a private cause of action.  (Docket No. 228 at 17) (citing Touche 
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 In sum, the District Court properly concluded that Walzer failed to state a federal 
claim and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint without leave to amend 
or in declining to reconsider the merits of that ruling. 
B. Walzer‟s Remaining Arguments 
 Each of Walzer‟s remaining arguments lacks merit.  Walzer argues throughout his 
brief that we remanded in order for the District Court to determine the arbitrability of his 
federal claims under the 1992 arbitration clause.  Thus, according to Walzer, our mandate 
precluded the District Court both from staying proceedings pending the FINRA 
arbitration and from entertaining defendants‟ motion to dismiss, and required the court 
instead to permit discovery on the 1992 agreement.
7
 
 We disagree.  In our previous opinion, we held only that Walzer‟s federal claims 
are not barred by the New York state court‟s ruling that his state-court claims are subject 
to arbitration.  See Walzer, 221 F. App‟x at 157.  We noted that the 1992 arbitration 
clause was not of record and that whether it encompassed his federal claims remained an 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979)).  Walzer now concedes that he lacks 
standing to assert this claim, but seeks leave to “bring the SEC in” to do so.  (Appellant‟s 
Br. at 53.)  There is no basis for that request. 
 
7
 Walzer may have waived his right to appellate review of the Magistrate Judge‟s orders 
disallowing discovery and staying proceedings pending the FINRA arbitration because he 
did not seek reconsideration by the District Court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Siers v. 
Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 114-16 (3d Cir. 1983).  Walzer, however, properly sought 
reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge‟s order permitting defendants to file their motion 
to dismiss.  (Docket No. 206.)  Our review of that issue effectively resolves the others as 
well because Walzer‟s underlying argument relates to all three issues. 
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open question, but we did not require or preclude any particular proceedings in that 
regard.  See id.  Nor did Walzer suffer any conceivable prejudice from the stay of federal 
proceedings pending the FINRA arbitration.  Thus, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in these respects. 
 Walzer also argues that the District Court should not have entertained defendants‟ 
motions to dismiss because they were successive motions in violation of Rule 12(g)(2).  
(Appellant‟s Br. at 12-18.)  That rule prohibits successive Rule 12(b)(6) motions raising 
“a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier 
motion.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2).  We need not decide whether the District Court 
entertained defendants‟ motions in technical violation of this rule, however, because any 
error in that regard would be harmless.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (“On the hearing of any 
appeal . . ., the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without 
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).   
 Walzer did not state a federal claim for the reasons discussed above, and 
defendants did not waive that defense by not including it in their respective initial Rule 
12(b)(6) motions.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).  Instead, it remained available to them in 
a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c).  See id.  The District Court 
properly accepted all of Walzer‟s factual allegations as true for purposes of defendants‟ 
later Rule 12(b)(6) motions.  Thus, it is as though defendants had filed answers admitting 
those allegations and then filed their motions under Rule 12(c) rather than Rule 12(b)(6).  
Requiring them to take those additional steps would have served no practical purpose 
13 
 
under the circumstances presented here.
8
  
 We have reviewed the remainder of Walzer‟s arguments and conclude that they 
lack merit as well.
9
 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  The 
parties‟ requests for sanctions are denied, but we will tax costs against Walzer pursuant to 
Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(2).  We also deny Walzer‟s motion for reconsideration of the May 
11, 2011 Clerk‟s order permitting defendants to file a supplemental appendix and 
defendants‟ motion to strike the documents attached to the hard copy of Walzer‟s reply 
brief.  
                                                 
8
 Walzer raised this argument in his first motion for reconsideration, and the District 
Court rejected it for essentially the same reason that we do.  (Docket No. 236 at 19-20.)  
The District Court also faulted Walzer for failing to raise the argument in opposition to 
defendants‟ motion to dismiss.  We agree with Walzer that he had indeed raised the 
argument (e.g., Docket No. 216-2), but that point is moot because the District Court 
addressed the argument‟s substance and it lacks merit in any event. 
 
9
Those arguments are that defendants failed to serve him with their response to his first 
motion for reconsideration, that the District Court “ignored” his own request for 
arbitration, and that he can amend his complaint to name additional defendants and assert 
additional claims.  Walzer also alleges numerous perceived errors and improprieties in 
the FINRA arbitration.  Those allegations are not properly before us. 
